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STATE COURT ADJUDICATION OF FEDERAL
RESERVED WATER RIGHTS
Water is essential to the survival and development of the arid west-
ern United States.) Without specifying the exact quantity,2 the United
States has asserted claims to vast amounts 3 of water in the West4
through the doctrine of federal reserved water rights,5 thus hindering
effective planning by the states6 and increasing current users' fears of
losing their water to the Government. 7 The McCarran Amendment, 8
1. "In this part of the country there are vast areas in which rainfall is slight, water
extremely valuable, and land virtually worthless unless there is available at least an
adequate amount of water to supply domestic uses." Note, Western Water and the
Reservation Theory-The Need for a Water Rights Settlement Act, 26 MONT. L. REV.
199, 200 (1965). The entire region's stability depends on the law governing water rights.
After nearly 100 years of development "state law has achieved a reasonable certainty of
results which has permitted substantial public and private development in the West."
THE PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMM'N, ONE-THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND, 142 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as PLLRC].
2. "In some instances, Federal officials refused to disclose their existing uses of
water and were also claiming reserved rights to future uses in any amount necessary to
serve the purpose of withdrawn federal lands." NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER
POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE, 460 (1973) [hereinafter cited as NWC].
3. Federal lands are the source of most of the water in the 11 coterminous western
states, providing 61 percent of the total natural runoff occurring in the region. Most
of this runoff comes from land withdrawn or reserved for specific purposes. Forest
Service reservations contribute about 88 and 8 percent respectively of the runoff
from public lands and more than 59 percent of the total yield from all lands of those
states.
PLLRC, supra note 1, at 141.
4. Federal reserved water rights affect the following seventeen western states: Arizo-
na, California, Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyo-
ming. Morreale, Federal-State Conflicts Over Western Waters-A Decade of "Clarifying
Legislation," 20 RUTGERS L. REV. 423, 431 n.41 (1966).
5. The withdrawal or reservation of Federal Lands for specified purposes also
reserved rights to use water on such lands, even though the legislative or executive
action made no mention of water or its use. . . [This reservation was] of sufficient
unappropriated water to satisfy the reasonable requirements of those [land] reser-
vations without regard to the provisions of state law.
PLLRC, supra note 1, at 144. The doctrine is based on the theory that because the
federal government once owned all the western land and water as sovereign, it still owns
all the water of which it did not specifically dispose. Morreale, supra note 4, at 431.
6. NWC, supra note 2, at 460; PLLRC, supra note 1, at 141-49.
7. Under the doctrine of federal reserved water rights such rights "would carry a
priority as of the date of the reservation or withdrawal of the lands." PLLRC, supra
note 1, at 142. This date often antedates all other uses of the river system.
[S]ince the priority date of reserved Federal rights is the date the Federal establish-
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which waives immunity to joinder of the United States in suits to
adjudicate water rights, has been applied to reserved waters9 and may
be the means of forcing the federal government to quantify' ° its
claims 1 . This objective was furthered when the United States Sup-
ment was created-usually the turn of the century or earlier-a use commenced at
any time by the Federal Government could wipe out water rights for oher users that
may have been in effect for 70 years or longer and without compensation.
NWC, supra note 2, at 460. For general discussions on the conflict between Government
claims and private rightholders and some suggested solutions, see Corker, Let There Be
No Nagging Doubts: Nor Shall Private Property, Including Water Rights, Be Taken For
Public Use Without Just Compensation, 6 LAND & WATER L. REV. 109, 110 (1970)
(arguing that taking of water rights should be compensated); Kiechel & Burke, Federal-
State Relations in Water Resources Adjudication and Administration: Integration of
Reserved Rights with Appropriated Rights, 18 RocKy MTN. MIN. L. INST. 531 (1972)
(generally favors the federal position and argues against compensation); Moses, The
Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine From 1866 through Eagle County, 8 NAT. RES.
LAW. 221 (1975) (on the background of the doctrine and the sources of federal power to
reserve and to take water); Comment, The McCarran Amendment-A Method of Clarify-
ing the Implied Reservation Doctrine, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 587 (1972) (the possible
problems of using the McCarran Amendment to join U.S. in state court adjucications);
10 LAND & WATER L. REV. 477 (1975) (procedural problems in various states' determina-
tions of federal water rights).
8. The McCarran Amendment provides:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other source, or (2) for
the administration of such rights, where it appears that the United States is the
owner or is in the process of acquiring water rights by appropriation under state
law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise, and the United States is a necessary
party to such suit. The United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be
deemed to have waived any right to plead that the state laws are inapplicable or that
the United States is not amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall
be subject to the judgments, orders and decrees of the court having jurisdiction,
and may obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for costs
shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
(b) Summons or other process in any such suit shall be served upon the Attorney
General or his designated representative.(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed as authorizing the joinder of the
United States in any suit or controversy in the Supreme Court of the United States
involving the right of the States to the use of the water of any interstate stream.
43 U.S.C. §666 (1970).
9. United States v. District Court (Eagle County), 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
10. The process of determining the amount the government claims has been called
"quantification." PLLRC, supra note 1, at 141-49. "The prospective claims of the
Government are highly uncertain as to time, manner and quantity of use." This has
hindered planning and, therefore, development of the area has also been affected. NWC,
supra note 2, at 467. The Government resists quantification apparently for policy
reasons. "Private appropriators would like to see the federal rights quantified. The
Government on the other hand, considers the open-ended nature to be a valuable
property right, and essential to effective national planning." Comment, Adjudication of
Federal Reserved Water Rights, 32 U. COLO. L. REv. 161 (1970).
11. In 1970, the Public Land Law Review Commission (PLLRC) found the major
obstacle in refining and clarifying the doctrine of federal reserved water rights was the




reme Court in Colorado Rover Conservation District v. United States
12
held that the McCarran Amendment favored litigation of federal re-
served water rights in state courts.
The United States instituted suit in Colorado District Court for
adjudication of its reserved water rights in Colorado Water Division
Seven 3 under authority of 28 U.S.C. §1345.14 Approximately 1000
water rightholders, all in Division Seven, which is 300 miles from
federal court in Denver, were named as defendants. 15 The State of
Colorado conducts on-going adjudication of water rights in special
state courts established under the 1969 Colorado Water Determination
Act.16 Shortly after the federal suit was instituted, the United States
was joined in the state adjudication in Water Division Seven under the
authority of the McCarran Amendment.' 7 Colorado then moved in the
district court to dismiss the federal court case. 18 The motion was
granted on the grounds of abstention and comity.19 The Tenth Circuit
which the PLLRC called "an unsatisfactory vehicle for obtaining definition of Federal
reservation claims," because of earlier adverse decisions. PLLRC, supra note 1, at 148.
12. 424 U.S. 800 (1976), rev'g United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir, 1974),
aff'g United States v. Akin, No. C-4497 (D. Colo. June 10, 1973), rehearing denied, 426
U.S. 912 (1976).
13. For purposes of water rights adjudication, Colorado is divided into seven divi-
sions. Colorado River Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 804 (1976).
14. "Except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress, the district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of all civil actions, suits or proceedings commenced by the
United States, or by any agency or officer thereof expressly authorized to sue by
Act of Congress." 28 U.S.C. §1345 (1970).
15. 424 U.S. at 805.
16. The 1969 Colorado Water Determination Act was described by the Supreme
Court as follows:
Under the Colorado Act, the State is divided into seven Water Divisions, each
Division encompassing one or more entire drainage basins for the larger rivers in
Colorado. Adjudication of water claims within each Division occurs on a continu-
ous basis. Each month, Water Referees in each Division rule on applications for
water rights filed within the preceding five months or refer those applications to the
Water Judge of their Division. Every six months, the Water Judge passes on
referred applications and contested decisions by referees. A State Engineer and
Engineers for each Division are responsible for the administration and distribution
of waters of the State according to the determination in each Division.
424 U.S. at 804-05; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1974). See also, Note
Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights in the Federal Courts, 46 U.COLO. L.
REV. 555, 568 n.79 (1975).
17. 424 U.S. at 806.
18. United States v. Akin, No. C-4497 (D. Colo. June 10, 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 115
(10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Colorado River Conservation Dist., 424
U.S. 800 (1976). Colorado based its motion on the grounds that the McCarran Amend-
ment deprived the federal court of jurisdiction over water rights within a state. 424 U.S.
at 806.
19. United States v. Akin, No. C-4497 (D. Colo. June 10, 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 115
1977]
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Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court had jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1345 and that abstention would be inappro-
priate.20 . The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of appe-
als, finding that despite the propriety of the district court's jurisdic-
tion, "the consent to jurisdiction given by the McCarran Amendment
bespeaks a policy that recognizes the availability of comprehensive
state systems as the means for achieving" unified proceedings, thus
avoiding piecemeal litigation and "inconsistent dispositions of
property. "21
Disputes over federal ownership of western waters are due, in part,
to the nature of the state water laws. 22 When the western states were
created from federal land, 23 the rule of prior appropriation was adopted
by most of the states.24 This rule provided that the first user of a
reasonable amount of water for a beneficial purpose had a right to that
amount for as long as the use continued.25 Because a right by prior
appropriation does not depend on ownership of land or the source of
(10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United States v. Colorado River Conservation Dist., 424
U.S. 800 (1976). "Without deciding the jurisdictional question, the District Court, on
June 21, 1973, granted the motion. . . stating that the doctrine of abstention required
deference to the proceedings in Division 7." 424 U.S. at 806.
20. United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. United
States v. Colorado River Conservation Dist., 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The appellate court
held that McCarran did not repeal 28 U.S.C. § 1345 in water cases. "Section 666 has a
very limited coverage and is perhaps only procedural. It permits, but does not necessari-
ly require, the United States being subjected to state jurisdiction." 504 F.2d at 119. The
court found that federal courts had first acquired jurisdiction of this case and that they
could not decline the exercise of expressly granted jurisdiction. Id. at 120.
21. 424 U.S. at 819.
22. See generally, e.g., PLLRC, supra note 1.
23. These states were created under the property clause of the U.S. Constitution.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and
Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United
States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
claims of the United States or of any particular State.
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 3.
24. By 1935, "the doctrine of appropriation had been completely accepted. The
states at this point had every reason to feel secure in their ability to legislate as they
chose in regard to non-navigable waters within their boundaries. It was settled that even
government patentees had only received land titles and had to acquire water rights in
accordance with state law." Note, Western Water and the Reservation Theory-The
Need for a Water Rights Settlement Act, supra note 1, at 203.
25. Senator McCarran described prior appropriation as:
[blased on the proposition that "first in time is first in right," and recognizes the
right of a landowner on a given stream to continue the use of the water which he has
appropriated for a beneficial use. No person can appropriate more than is reason-
ably necessary for the benefit of his land, and must continue to use that appropria-
tion in a beneficial manner.




the water, 26 there was little concern over use of water from land which
was reserved or acquired by the federal government. 27
For a time, the United States appeared to comply with state law28
and tried its water claims in state courts. 29 In Federal Power Commis-
sion v. Oregon (Pelton Dam), 30 however, the Supreme Court held that
federal statutes dispositive of water rights3 did not dispose of water on
26. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 142.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Any doubts as to the states' authority were "completely laid to rest" in California
Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935). Note, Western
Water and the Reservation Theory-The Need for a Water Rights Settlement Act, supra
note 1, at 202. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); U.S. v. Rio Grande Dam and
Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1898); Moses, The Federal Reserved WaterRights Doctrine
from 1866 through Eagle County, supra note 7, at 127. The Court found in California
Oregon Power Co. that Congress recognized the supremacy of state law "in respect of
the acquisition of water for the reclamation of public lands of the United States and lands
of its Indian wards." 295 U.S. at 164 n.2.
30. 349 U.S. 435 (1955). The Court found that "the Desert Land Act covers 'sources
of water supply upon the public lands. . . .' The lands before us in this case are not
'public lands' but 'reservations.' " Id. at 448. A similar decision had been reached
earlier with respect to Indian lands in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908). The
court held in Winters that "[t]he power of the Government to reserve the waters and
exempt them from appropriation under the state laws is not denied and could not be
... . That the Government did reserve them we have decided, and for a use which
would be necessarily continued through the years." Id. at 577. The Winters case
reformed an agreement granting the Indians some land but mistakenly omitting mention
of water rights.
31. "Congress enacted three important acts dispositive of the water rights on the
public domain. At least, most lawyers thought so until the Supreme Court disabused
them." Moses, The Federal Reserved Water Rights Doctrine from 1866 through Eagle
County, supra note 7, at 226. These Acts were the Homestead Act of 1862, 12 Stat. 392,
the Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 218, and the Desert Land Act of 1877, 19 Stat. 377. See 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1970) which provides:
Whenever by priority of possession, rights to the use of water for mining, agricul-
tural, manufacturing, or other purposes, have vested and accrued, and the same are
recognized and acknowledged by the local customs, laws and the decisions of the
courts, the possessors and owners of such vested rights shall be maintained and
protected in the same ....
All patents granted, or preemption or homesteads allowed, shall be subject to any
vested and accrued water rights, or rights to ditches and reservoirs used in connec-
tion with such water rights as may have been acquired under or recognized by this
section.
43 U.S.C. § 321 (1970) provides:
It]hat the right to the use of water. . . on or to any tract of desert land of three
hundred and twenty acres shall depend upon bona fide prior appropriation; and
such right shall not exceed the amount of water actually appropriated, and neces-
sarily used for the purpose of irrigation and reclamation; and all surplus water over
and above such actual appropriation and use, together with the water of all lakes,
rivers and other sources of water supply upon the public lands, and not navigable,
shall remain and be held free for the appropriation and use of the public for
irrigation, mining and manufacturing purposes subject to existing rights.
1977]
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lands reserved by the Government. This decision allowed the United
States to build a dam on federal lands in contravention of state law.32 In
Arizona v. California,33 the Supreme Court went a step further and
awarded waters from the Colorado River on the basis of federal re-
served rights. The Supreme Court held that the United States had the
power "to reserve water rights for its reservations and its property." 34
Further, the Court determined that rights reserved were for any
amount necessary to cover future as well as present needs. 35 The
Pelton Dam and Arizona v. California decisions created the doctrine
of federal reserved water rights36 nearly 100 years after the creation of
the western states. Since all available water had been appropriated
without regard to federal reserved water claims, 37 these decisions
could have a devastating impact on the economy of arid regions. 38
The McCarran Amendment was enacted in 1952 before the develop-
ment of federal reserved rights, 39 but it has become a method for
alleviating problems arising from Government claims.40 Before McCar-
ran, complete state adjudication of water rights was impossible,
whenever the United States held a claim, because of sovereign immun-
ity.41 The United States' claims were usually acquired when water
32. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 142.
33. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
34. Id. at 598.
35. Id. at 600.
36. See generally NWC, supra note 2; PLLRC, supra note I.
37. "Due to the fact that water is so scarce in the Western States, all such water has
for many years been appropriated and put to beneficial use." 97 CONG. REC. 12947
(remarks of Sen. McCarran).
38. If the exercise of reserved rights deprived current users, the economy of the West
particularly would suffer.
The importance of the water yield from public lands to the economy, present and
future, of the 11 western states is clear: Approximately $12.5 billion has been
invested by public and private sources in water storage facilities, and additional
billions have been invested to irrigate 23 million acres of land dependent in major
part on public land water yields; about 96 percent of the region's 32 million people
and most of its major cities and metropolitan areas are dependent in some degree on
public land water; and the virtually entire hydroelectric capacity of 23.6 million
kilowatts (as of 1968) is dependent upon water which originates on public lands.
PLLRC, supra note 1, at 141.
39. The doctrine of federal reserved water rights dates from either the Pelton Dam
case, PLLRC, supra note 1, at 142, or Arizona v. California, NWC, supra note 2, at 464.
40. See Comment, Limiting Federal Reserved Water Rights Through the State
Courts, 1972 UTAH L. REV. 48, 54.
41. [IThe State courts are vested with jurisdiction necessary for the proper and
efficient disposition thereof, and by reason of the interlocking of adjudicated rights
on any stream system, any order or action affecting one right affacti all rights.
Accordingly, all water users on a stream, in practically every case, are interested




rights were transferred 42 with land that was purchased from private
holders by the Government. McCarran permits joinder of the United
States "in any suit for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a
river system or other source' 43 where the United States is the owner
"by purchase . . .or otherwise."44 The purpose of McCarran is to
produce "a proper and complete adjudication of the water rights of a
given stream or water source" and avoid piecemeal adjudication by
joining "all the parties having or claiming to have an interest in the
waters of said stream." '45
Judicial interpretation of McCarran before 1971 served primarily to
limit its applicability. 46 McCarran can be invoked to join the United
States only in a judicial hearing47 in which all parties with rights in a
particular stream system are before the court.48 In addition, the hearing
must adjudicate the rights of all parties on a given stream. 49 McCarran,
however, does not limit waiver of immunity to federal courts but also
operates to waive immunity in suits brought in state court. 50
suit in, or orders of, a State court. . . could materially interfere with the lawful and
equitable use of water for beneficial use by the other water users who are amenable
to and bound by the decrees and orders of the State courts.
S. REP. No. 755, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. at 5 (1951).
42. 97 CONG. REC. 12948 (1951) (remarks of Sen. McCarran). Rights acquired from
private holders differ from reserved rights in that reserved rights date from original
federal ownership prior to "statehood."
43. S. REP. No. 755, 82d Cong., Ist Sess. at 2 (1951).
44. Id. (emphasis added).
45. 97 CONG. REC. 12948 (1951)(remarks of Sen. McCarran).
46. Both PLLRC and NWC view the McCarran Amendment as poorly drafted and of
little practical use. See PLLRC, supra note 1, at 148; NWC, supra note 2, at 466.
47. Rank v. Krug (United States), 142 F. Supp. I (S.D. Cal. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. California v. Rank, 293 F.2d 340 (9th Cir. 1961), 307 F.2d 96 (9th Cir.
1962), modified on other grounds sub nom. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). The
court held, "[b]y common understanding, the word adjudicate means determination by a
court or judge in a judicial proceeding. It requires a judgement or a decree by a court."
Id. at 73.
48. Miller v. Jennings, 243 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1957). The court found "[t]here can be
an adjudication of rights with respect to the upper Rio Grande only in a proceeding
where all persons who have rights are before the tribunal." Id. at 159. Accord, Califor-
nia v. United States, 235 F.2d 647 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Hennen, 300 F. Supp.
256 (D. Nev. 1968).
49. Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609 (1963). The Court found the pending litigation
inadequate to meet all possible claims. "In addition to the fact that all of the claimants to
water rights along the river are not made parties, no relief is either asked or granted as
between claimants, nor are priorities sought to be established as to the appropriative and
prescriptive rights asserted." Id. at 618-19.
50. In re Green River Drainage Area, 147 F. Supp. 127, 134-35, 148-49 (D. Utah
1968).
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In 1971, the Supreme Court first considered federal reserved water
rights in the context of the McCarran Amendment." In United States
v. District Court (Eagle County),52 the United States challenged state
court jurisdiction over federal reserved water rights. The Court held
that McCarran was "broad enough to embrace 'reserved' waters." 53 In
United States v. District Court (Water Division No. 5),54 the compan-
ion case, the Court included Colorado's system of on-going, monthly
hearings within the definition of general adjudication.5 5 Although Eagle
County and Water Division No. 5 expanded McCarran's applicability,
neither decision suggested that reserved water rights must be settled in
state courts. They merely support the position that a state court may
adjucicate federal reserved water rights.56
In Colorado River Conservation District v. United States, 1 the Sup-
reme Court held that the United States' suit for adjudication of federal
reserved water rights should be dismissed in favor of the state suit in
which the United States had been joined as defendant under the
McCarran Amendment.5 8 The Court rejected the United States' argu-
ments that federal jurisdiction must be exercised, 59 and that the Gov-
ernment's fiduciary relationship to Indians required this case to be in
federal court.60 Likewise, the Court refused to accept the Colorado's
51. See notes 52-56 and accompanying text infra.
52. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
53. Id. at 523. The Court added that "all such questions, including the volume and
scope of particular reserved rights are federal questions which, if preserved, can be
reviewed here after final judgment by the Colorado court." Id. at 526.
54. 401 U.S. 527 (1971).
55. The Court defined general adjudication under McCarran. "43 U.S.C. § 666 does
not cover consent by the United States to be sued in a private suit to determine its rights
against a few claimants. The present suit, like the one in the Eagle County case, reaches
all claims." Id. at 529.
56. Even after Eagle County and Water Division No. 5, doubts continued as to the
efficacy of McCarran. See, e.g., Comment: Limiting Federal Reserved Water Rights
Through State Courts, supra note 40, at 54.
57. 424 U.S. 800 (1976).
58. Id. at 820-21.
59. Id.
60. The United States argued that "because of its fiduciary responsibility to protect
Indian rights, any state court jurisdiction over Indian property should not be recognized
unless expressly conferred by Congress." Id. at 812. The Court took up the Indian claim
immediately after finding federal court jurisdiction, because a finding that the matter of
Indian water rights should be decided in federal court would have determined this case.
The Court dismissed the Indian claim, however, holding that the policy and history of
McCarran allowed joinder of Indian water rights in state court. The Court declared that
federal responsibility to Indians had not been abdicated and that Indian claims may be




arguments based on abstention and comity. 61 The Court found "diffe-
rent, limited" circumstances for dismissal. 62 Focusing on the policy of
the McCarran Amendment, the Supreme Court held that the desired
end of avoidance of piecemeal litigation 63 in a complete adjudication6
at a conveniently located forum65 was best served in the state court. 66
Rights: Some Emerging Frontiers, 21 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INsT. 743 (1975); Note,
Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights in the Federal Courts, 46 U. COLO. L.
REv. 555 (1975).
Pelcyger, supra at 747, states that there is "compelling evidence of the hostility of
states and their courts to Indians." The author cites numerous cases where state court
decisions adverse to property rights were reversed by the Supreme Court. Id. at 745-47.
61. Colorado argued that the dismissal to state court would be a proper exercise of
abstention and comity. The Court found that none of the weighty reasons for abstention
appeared in this case. It defined these reasons as follows: (a) federal constitutional issues
which might be mooted or presented in a different posture by state proceedings; (b)
difficult questions of state law bearing on a policy problem; (c) federal jurisdiction has
been invoked to restrain state criminal proceedings. 424 U.S. at 813-17. The Court
dismissed comity when it briefly alluded to it. "[There are principles unrelated to
considerations of proper constitutional adjudicition and regard for federal-state relations
which govern in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent juris-
dictions, either by federal courts or by state and federal courts." Id. at 817 (emphasis
added).
62. The Court referred to four types of "doctrines" it had previously invoked for
dismissing cases from federal court to state court. Under the first doctrine the court first
obtaining in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction over the property hears the case. E.g.,
Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964); Princess Lida v. Thompson 305 U.S. 456
(1939). In Colorado River Conservation District, the Court found that water rights
adjudictions "essentially involve the disposition of property." 424 U.S. at 819. A second
doctrine provides that the court first obtaining jurisdiction over a case takes the case.
E.g., Pacific Livestock Co. v. Oregon Water Bd., 241 U.S. 440 (1916). But see, e.g.,
United States v. Bank of New York & Trust Co., 296 U.S. 463,480 (1936) (federal court
first obtained jurisdiction in this case but dismissed it to state court). In Colorado River
Conservation District, Colorado began the water rights adjudication for the stream, but
the Government did not become a party until the case was brought in federal court.
Under the third doctrine, a court will dismiss a case to a more convenient forum. E.g.,
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); see I W. BARRON, A. HOLTZOFF & C.
WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 87 (1960); C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, 165 (2d ed. 1970). In Colorado River Conservation District,
the Court observed that 1000 defendants in the water district live 300 miles from the
federal forum. 424 U.S. at 820. Finally, a court will dismiss a case to avoid piecemeal
litigation. E.g., Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491 (1942). The Court found that
avoidance of piecemeal litigation was a major purpose of the McCarran Amendment. 424
U.S. at 819.
63. 424 U.S. at 819.
64. Id. at 820.
65. Id.
66. Id. Justice Stewart's dissent, joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, disag-
reed with the Court's treatment of the case under property law and in rem jurisdiction.
Id. at 821-26 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart argued that avoidance of pieceme-
al litigation would be impossible under the circumstances of this case, and that the Court
1977]
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Jurisdiction to adjudicate federal reserved water rights in state
courts follows earlier decisions under the McCarran Amendment. 67
Colorado River Conservation District was, however, the first case to
favor state court adjudication of federal reserved water rights and the
first decision concerned with effectuating the goals of the McCarran
Amendment.' This case represents, therefore, the broadest interpreta-
tion of McCarran to date.
The decision in Colorado River Conservation District may create
some problems. States with systematic, on-going adjudication, such as
Colorado, could foreclose federal courts from exercising jurisdiction,
even in circumstances where federal jurisdiction would be desirable. 69
A strong state policy preferring water rights adjudication in state court
could work a hardship on out-of-state litigants.70 Finally, federal re-
served water rights, including Indian reservations, might also be sub-
ject to prejudices or favoritism in state court.71
Despite these problems Colorado River Conservation District v.
United States is an effective step toward quantification of federal
had an obligation to exercise unflagging jurisdiction over what he believed to be ques-
tions of federal law. Id.
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he added three comments: federal
claims should be litigated by the United States in federal court, unless an express
statutory mandate commands otherwise; the decision will restrict access to federal court
of private plaintiffs asserting water right claims in Colorado; and finally, the Supreme
Court should defer to the court of appeals on balancing factors for and against federal
jurisdiction. Id. at 826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 820. See notes 51-56 and accompanying text supra.
68. In Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976), the Supreme Court decided
another case involving reserved water rights. Though the McCarran Amendment was not
involved in the case, the Court referred to the Act and to Colorado River Conservation
District. The Court found that "federal water rights are not dependent upon state law or
state procedures and they need not be adjuciated only in state courts. Id. at 145.
Colorado River Conservation District does not require the McCarran Amendment to be
treated as a substantive statute. Rather, "the policy evinced by the amendment may, in
the appropriate case, require the United States to adjudicate its water rights in state
forums." Id. at 146. This may indicate that in the future, the Court may balance the
policy of the Amendment and the "appropriateness" of the case to determine if litigation
over federal reserved water rights is more properly brought in state or federal court.
69. One example of a situation in which federal jurisdiction may be desirable is in the
area of conservation. Cappaert involved a pool of water in a cavern which was the only
known habitat of a rare species of fish. The pool and the fish were specifically protected
by a Presidential Proclamation of January 17, 1952. The Court held that the pool was
within the implied reservation doctrine and that the case was properly in federal court.
Id. at 138-42. Conservation of wildlife is one of many areas which may warrant special
federal protection.
70. 424 U.S. at 827 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




reserved water rights. States with statutes similar to Colorado's 1969
Water Determination Act72 will be able to join the United States
whenever federal reserved water rights are among claims being liti-
gated on a particular river or river system.73 The federal government
could then be required to specify the amount of water it claims. If
Colorado River Conservation District does not lead to such clarifica-
tion, it should at least result in greater coordination between state and
federal interests in the disposition of water rights. Finally, whatever
"national planning" the federal government intends to accomplish
with its reserved waters will take place on the state level in full view of
all interested parties.
Margaret Luers Koch
72. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (1974).
73. For a discussion of problems faced by states which do not use a judicial system to
distribute water rights but instead rely on administrative determinations, see 10 LAND &
WATER L. REV. 477 (1975).
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